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I. Introduction 
Traditionally, privacy violations have been understood as invasive 
actions by particular wrongdoers who cause direct injury to victims.  
Victims experience embarrassment, mental distress, or harm to their 
reputations.  Privacy is not infringed until these mental injuries materialize.  
Thus, the law responds when a person’s deepest secrets are exposed, 
reputation is tarnished, or home is invaded.  Under the traditional view, 
privacy is an individual right, remedied at the initiative of the individual. 
This way of understanding privacy and the manner in which it should 
be protected is being severely challenged by the privacy problems arising 
in today’s Information Age.  These are problems involving the flow of 
information:  the construction of detailed digital dossiers about people; the 
increasing accessibility of personal information; the growing use of 
personal information to make important decisions affecting people’s lives; 
the widespread transfer of information between a variety of entities; the 
burgeoning expansion in different uses for personal data; and the emerging 
collaboration between private sector entities gathering personal data and 
government law enforcement officials.  These problems are of a different 
character than traditional privacy problems, and they must be 
conceptualized and protected against differently. 
Protecting privacy starts with conceptualizing privacy.  We need to 
understand the nature of privacy problems in order to solve them.  In this 
article, I contend that many of these emerging privacy problems must be 
understood “architecturally” as part of a larger social and legal structure.  
Consequently, protecting privacy must focus not merely on remedies and 
penalties but on shaping architectures.  I argue that many of the privacy 
problems posed by the Information Age cannot adequately be remedied by 
individual rights and remedies alone. 
In Part II, I employ the notion of architecture to describe a different 
way of understanding certain privacy problems and how the law should 
protect against them. 
In Part III, I illustrate these points with the example of identity theft, 
one of the most rapidly growing types of criminal activity.1  A criminal 
impersonates an individual by using personal data to obtain accounts, credit 
cards, and loans.  This upends a person’s life, destroys her credit, and often 
prevents her from engaging in important activities such as making 
purchases, obtaining loans or mortgages, renting an apartment, or even 
getting a job or license. 
 
  1. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Identity Thieves Thrive in Information Age; Rise of Online 
Data Brokers Makes Criminal Impersonation Easier, WASH. POST, May 31, 2001, at A1. 
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Identity theft is often conceptualized as the product of disparate 
thieves and crafty criminals.  The problem, however, has not been 
adequately conceptualized, and, as a result, enforcement efforts have been 
misdirected.  The problem, as I contend, is one created by an architecture 
that is deeply flawed.  Understanding identity theft in terms of architecture 
reveals that it is part of a larger problem that the law has thus far ignored. 
II. Architecture and the Protection of Privacy 
A. The Traditional Model 
The question of how to protect privacy was of paramount importance 
to Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis in 1890, when they wrote their 
profoundly influential article, The Right to Privacy.2  The authors raised 
great concern about new technologies for photography which would make 
taking photographs significantly easier and cheaper.3  These technological 
developments intersected with a rapidly growing press, which was 
becoming increasingly sensationalistic.  “Of the desirability—indeed of the 
necessity—of some such protection [of privacy], there can, it is believed, 
be no doubt.”4  The problem facing Warren and Brandeis was that the 
common law in 1890 did not provide much protection for privacy. 
Around the same time Warren and Brandeis wrote their article, E.L. 
Godkin, a famous social commentator of his day,5 also observed that 
privacy was being endangered by the excessive exploits of the press.  
Godkin was not optimistic about the possibility of a legal solution to these 
new threats to privacy: 
 In truth, there is only one remedy for the violations of the right  to 
privacy within the reach of the American public, and that is but an 
imperfect one.  It is to be found in attaching social discredit to 
invasions of it on the part of conductors of the press.  At present this 
check can hardly be said to exist.6 
Unlike Godkin, Warren and Brandeis believed that law could solve 
these privacy problems.  Warren and Brandeis argued that existing legal 
causes of action did not adequately protect privacy but that legal concepts 
in the common law could be modified to protect privacy effectively.  The 
common law had the necessary foundations for protecting privacy, for it 
 
 2. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 3. Id. at 195–96. 
 4. Id. at 196. 
 5. See Elbridge L. Adams, The Right to Privacy and its Relation to the Law of Libel, 39 AM. 
L. REV. 37 (1905); Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1 
(1979). 
 6. E.L. Godkin, The Rights of the Citizen: IV. To His Own Reputation, SCRIBNER’S 
MAGAZINE, 1890, at 67; see also E.L. Godkin, The Right to Privacy, THE NATION, Dec. 25, 
1890, at 496–97. 
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“secures to each individual the right of determining, ordinarily, to what 
extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to 
others.”7  This right “is merely an instance of the enforcement of a more 
general right of the individual to be let alone.”8  From this more general 
right, the authors concluded, protections against privacy violations could be 
derived in the common law.9 
What Warren and Brandeis achieved was nothing short of 
magnificent.  By pulling together various isolated strands of the common 
law, the authors demonstrated that the law contained the seeds of remedies 
for privacy invasions.  They illustrated why creating these remedies would 
not constitute a radical addition to the common law but would merely be an 
extension and an elaboration of what was already germinating.10 
Warren and Brandeis discussed three remedies to protect privacy.  
First, they contended that invasions of privacy should give rise to “[a]n 
action of tort for damages in all cases.”11  Regarding damages, “[i]f the 
invasion of privacy constitutes a legal injuria, the elements for demanding 
redress exist, since already the value of mental suffering, caused by an act 
wrongful in itself, is recognized as a basis for compensation.”12 Therefore, 
Warren and Brandeis’s primary enforcement mechanism consisted of tort 
damages to compensate individuals for the “mental suffering” caused by 
privacy invasions.  Second, in a “very limited class of cases,” an injunction 
might be appropriate.13  Third, with legislation, criminal penalties can be 
imposed “within narrower limits.”14 
Warren and Brandeis’s understanding of privacy problems has been 
highly influential in the development of privacy law, and I will refer to this 
understanding as the “traditional model.” Under this model, privacy is 
understood as a series of discrete wrongs to specific individuals.  These 
wrongs occur through the actions of particular wrongdoers.  The injury is 
experienced by the individuals who are wronged.  For example, a privacy 
violation that would fit well into the traditional model is a newspaper 
publishing a photograph of a person in the nude.  There is a particular 
wrongdoer (the newspaper) that engages in a particular action (publishing 
the photograph) which causes harm to a particular individual.  This harm 
consists of mental distress and any consequent physical or mental 
impairment. 
 
 7. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 198. 
 8. Id. at 205. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 206, 213 n.1 (“The application of an existing principle to a new state of facts is not 
judicial legislation.”). 
 11. Id. at 219. 
 12. Id. at 213. 
 13. Id. at 219. 
 14. Id. 
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Under the traditional model, privacy protections safeguard against 
these wrongs to individuals.  Protection consists of rights and remedies for 
each instance of harm, and in certain cases, criminal punishments for the 
wrongdoers. Thus, the traditional model is reactive.  It waits for harms to 
materialize in concrete form and then reacts.  The traditional model works 
to prevent future harms through the deterrent effects of civil liability and 
criminal penalties. 
Another aspect of the traditional model is that it often views privacy 
protections in the form of rights possessed and remedied at the initiative of 
individuals.  The value of protecting privacy is measured in terms of the 
value of preventing harm to the individual.  Privacy is treated as an 
individual entitlement.  In the words of one court, “[p]rivacy is inherently 
personal.  The right to privacy recognizes the sovereignty of the 
individual.”15  According to the Restatement of Torts:  “The right protected 
by the action for invasion of privacy is a personal right, peculiar to the 
individual whose privacy is invaded.”16  Under this view, privacy is 
enforced by providing individuals with remedies for privacy invasions.  For 
example, each of the four privacy torts, inspired by Warren and Brandeis’ 
1890 article,17 affords a remedy to specific harms caused to specific 
individuals.  The tort of intrusion upon seclusion protects against the 
intentional intrusion into an individual’s “solicitude or seclusion” or “his 
private affairs or concerns.”18 The public disclosure of private facts tort 
provides individuals with remedies against publicly revealing matters 
concerning their private lives.19 The tort of false light protects individuals 
against the dissemination of false information.20  And the tort of 
appropriation protects individuals from the use of their name or likeness for 
the benefit of another person or entity.21 
The privacy torts are designed to redress specific harms.  In many 
cases however, damages are likely to be small, thus creating little incentive 
to sue.  The result is that privacy is most protected in situations where 
damages can be defined palpably, such as where skeletons in the closet are 
revealed, where nudity is publicly disclosed, or where the press sneaks into 
a person’s home to obtain personal information. 
Like tort law, criminal law focuses on specific wrongdoers.  It aims to 
deter crime by establishing penalties for privacy invasions.  Criminal law is 
often reactive, responding to crime with punishment after its occurrence.  
Frequently, criminal law fails to be proactive in preventing crime.  
Although criminal law certainly works to deter crime, some crimes are 
 
 15. Smith v. City of Artesia, 772 P.2d 373, 376 (N.M.Ct. App. 1989). 
 16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652I comment (a)(1977). 
 17. Warren & Brandeis,  supra note 2, at 196. 
 18. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977). 
 19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977). 
 20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). 
 21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). 
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difficult to deter.  Criminal law can only reach a certain level of deterrence, 
which can be limited by difficulties in catching and prosecuting the 
perpetrators.  Crimes involving the use and dissemination of personal 
information present complicated enforcement problems, since these crimes 
can occur from anywhere in the world, are easy to conceal, and take a long 
time to detect. 
Although the traditional model works for a number of privacy 
problems, not all privacy problems are the same, and many privacy 
problems do not fit well into this model.  Elsewhere, I contended that 
privacy is not a unitary concept.22  I argued that privacy cannot be 
adequately conceptualized by isolating a common denominator in all of the 
multifarious things we understand as implicating privacy.  Instead, privacy 
should be conceptualized from the bottom-up, by focusing on particular 
problems which are related but do not necessarily share one element in 
common.  There are many different types of privacy problems, and 
although related, they differ in significant ways. 
The traditional model does not adequately account for many of the 
privacy problems arising today.  A number of privacy problems do not 
consist merely of a series of isolated and discrete invasions or harms, but 
are systemic in nature.  Although I have argued that privacy must be 
understood contextually and that privacy problems have differences which 
should be more carefully examined,23 this does not mean that privacy is 
invaded only through a series of singular incursions.  In certain contexts, 
the privacy harm is caused by a particular social or legal structure, not by a 
few isolated actors. 
Many modern privacy problems are systemic in nature.  They are the 
product of information flows, which occur between a variety of different 
entities.  There is often no single wrongdoer; responsibility is spread 
among a multitude of actors, with a vast array of motives and aims, each 
doing different things at different times.  For example, when a person 
unwittingly finds herself embroiled in a public news story, the invasiveness 
of the media is often not the product of one particular reporter.  Rather, the 
collective actions of numerous reporters camping outside one’s home and 
following one wherever she goes severely disrupt her life.  The difficulty in 
obtaining a legal remedy for this disruption is that no one reporter’s actions 
may be all that invasive or objectionable.  The harm is created by the 
totality of privacy invasions, but the tort of intrusion upon seclusion only 
focuses on each particular actor.24 
Today, much modern information gathering occurs in piecemeal 
fashion.  A difficulty I have described as the “aggregation problem” 
 
 22. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087, 1092 (2002). 
 23. Id. at 1126–43. 
 24. As Bruce Sanford contends: “A stake–out by a group of unrelated reporters should be 
viewed as no more than the sum of its separate parts.”  BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY 
§ 11.2, at 541 (2d ed. 1991) (Supp. 2003). 
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complicates the application of tort law in specific cases.25  In isolation, a 
particular piece of information may not be very invasive of one’s privacy.  
But when pieces of information are combined, they may form a detailed 
account of an individual, what I have referred to as a “digital biography.”26  
The whole may be greater than the sum of the parts.  This phenomenon 
occurs because information that is not revealing alone can be quite 
revealing in combination with other pieces of information. 
Further, the trade of personal information between private sector 
entities today is not readily analogous to the widespread disclosure of 
information by the media.  Entities often buy and sell information, resulting 
in the disclosure of that information to only a few other entities.  It is 
difficult to assess damages when one company maintains a database about 
a person and sells that information to other companies or the government.27  
These harms do not translate well to tort law or criminal law, which focus 
on isolated actors and address harms individually rather than collectively. 
The traditional view of privacy harms pervades much of the law of 
information privacy.  Courts often look for specific injuries.  For example, 
in U.S. West, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,28 the court 
struck down regulations of the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) requiring that consumers opt-in before telecommunications 
carriers could use or disclose their personal information.  The court 
reasoned that the governmental interest in protecting privacy was not 
“substantial” because the government failed to “show that the 
dissemination of the information desired to be kept private would inflict 
specific and significant harm on individuals, such as undue embarrassment 
or ridicule, intimidation or harassment, or misappropriation of sensitive 
personal information for the purposes of assuming another’s identity.”29  
This way of viewing the harm to privacy fails to acknowledge the larger 
systemic problems involved with information flow.  These problems affect 
the type of world we are creating.  As I have discussed at length elsewhere, 
the growing use and dissemination of personal information creates a 
Kafkaesque world of bureaucracy, where people are increasingly powerless 
and vulnerable, where personal information is not only outside our control 
 
 25. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and the 
Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1184–95 (2002) [hereinafter Access]; Daniel J. Solove, 
Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. 
REV. 1393, 1434 (2001) [hereinafter Solove, Privacy]. 
 26. See Access, supra note 25, at 1184–95. 
 27. Certain more modern privacy laws—namely, a number of the statutes passed since the 
1970s—have minimum damages provisions, eliminating the difficult task of proving specific 
harm.  See, e.g., The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a) (1993) 
(minimum $10,000 per violation); 18 U.S.C. § 2710(c) (West 1993) (liquidated damages of 
$2500).  Nevertheless, these laws often still suffer from other problems in the traditional model, 
discussed below. 
 28. 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 29. Id. at 1234–35. 
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but also is subjected to a bureaucratic process that is itself not adequately 
controlled.30  This generalized harm already exists; we need not wait for 
specific abuses to occur. 
Enforcement at the initiative of the individual also creates difficulties.  
Arguing from the traditional model, Fred Cate contends that although 
people claim they desire more privacy, their actions illustrate that they do 
not want to sacrifice much time or energy in obtaining it.31  The goal of the 
law, says Cate, should be to assist those who want to protect their privacy 
rather than to thrust a uniform wall of privacy around everyone:  “The law 
should serve as a gap-filler, facilitating individual action in those situations 
in which the lack of competition has interfered with private privacy 
protection.”32  Furthermore, according to Cate, the purpose of privacy 
rights is to “facilitate . . . the development of private mechanisms and 
individual choice as a means of valuing and protecting privacy.”33 
However, many privacy problems cannot be adequately redressed by 
relying on individual initiative alone. As Paul Schwartz argues, affording 
individuals a right to control their personal data improperly assumes that 
individuals have the ability to exercise meaningful control over their 
information.34  Schwartz calls this problem the “autonomy trap.”35 
Schwartz notes how consent screens on a website asking users to relinquish 
control over information often do so on a “take-it-or-leave-it basis” 
resulting in the “fiction” that people have “expressed informed consent to 
[the website’s] data processing practices.”36  Stated more broadly, there are 
a number of forces that prevent individuals from exercising their 
preferences to protect their privacy. 
For example, a person may want to purchase books from an online 
bookseller.  Suppose that the person’s privacy preferences consist of the 
information being kept very secure, not being disclosed to the government, 
and not being traded or disclosed to other companies (even in the event that 
the company goes bankrupt).  But the online bookseller’s privacy policy is 
standardized and often does not address these points with any reasonable 
degree of specificity.  The policy contains a blanket statement that 
information is kept secure, but there are not enough details for the person to 
make an accurate assessment of the level of security.  The policy says 
nothing about the bookseller’s policies regarding government access to 
personal information.  If the bookseller were issued a subpoena for the 
 
 30. Solove, Privacy, supra note 25 at 1399. 
 31. FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 196 (1997). 
 32. Id. at 131. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1609, 
1661–64 (1999) [hereinafter Privacy and Democracy]; see also Paul M. Schwartz, Internet 
Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815 (2000) [hereinafter Internet]. 
 35. Privacy and Democracy, supra note 34, at 1660. 
 36. Id. at 1662. 
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person’s data, would the bookseller oppose it?  Would the bookseller 
inform the person beforehand?  These questions are unanswered.37  Finally, 
the policy says that in the event the company goes bankrupt, information 
may be among the transferred assets.  And since privacy policies are 
remarkably similar among many companies, many other online bookstores 
offer similar terms.  If the person decides to purchase the book in a bricks-
and-mortar bookstore, she faces the same difficulties if she pays by credit 
card.38  There, the privacy policies are not even readily available to the 
purchaser.  In short, there is not a lot of bargaining over privacy.  This state 
of affairs exists partly because there are not many choices available to 
people regarding their privacy and because people are often not aware of 
the problems, risks, and dangers about how their information is handled.  
Even if they were, it is doubtful whether a person could create a special 
deal with a company to provide greater protections for her privacy.  With 
regard to the level of privacy protection offered by companies, a person 
must simply take it or leave it.  People are not afforded enough choices to 
exercise their privacy preferences.  Because companies controlling personal 
information are secretive about its uses and vague about their privacy 
policies, people lack adequate knowledge to make meaningful choices. 
Placing the onus on individuals to protect their privacy, as Cate 
recommends, can only be effective if individuals have the power to 
exercise their rights.  Enforcement mechanisms that rely upon individual 
initiative often fail because individuals lack the knowledge, power, and 
resources to use them.  Toni Morrison’s The Bluest Eye vividly illustrates 
this point.  The novel chronicles the tragic life of Pecola Breedlove, an 
African-American girl growing up in a poor and abusive family.  Pecola 
considers herself ugly and dreams of having blue eyes.  The Breedloves 
live amid dinginess and squalor in an abandoned store, which they have 
partitioned into rooms.  The Breedloves are radically disempowered.  All of 
the rights and legal protections afforded to people in this country have little 
effect on their lives.  For example, the Breedloves purchase a new sofa, 
which they receive in severely damaged condition.  Cholly Breedlove, 
Pecola’s father, futilely attempts to complain: 
  [The sofa] had been purchased new, but the fabric had been split 
straight across the back by the time it was delivered.  The store would 
not take the responsibility. . . . 
 
 37. See Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment 
Privacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1083, 1099–1100 (2002), for a discussion of the inadequacies of 
privacy policies in informing people about government access to their personal information. 
 38. This is illustrated by Kenneth Starr’s subpoena of Kramerbooks for records about Monica 
Lewinsky’s book purchases.  See Felicity Barringer, Using Books as Evidence Against Their 
Readers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at WK3.  In that case, Kramerbooks decided to challenge the 
subpoena, but the bookstore was not under any obligation to do so. 
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  ”Looka here, buddy.  It was O.K. when I put it on the truck.  The store 
can’t do anything about it once it’s on the truck. . . .” Listerine and 
Lucky Strike breath. 
  ”But I don’t want no tore couch if’n it’s bought new.”  Pleading eyes 
and tightened testicles. 
  ”Tough shit, buddy.  Your tough shit. . . .” 
  You could hate a sofa, of course—that is, you could hate a sofa.  But 
it didn’t matter.  You still had to get together $4.80 a month.  If you had 
to pay $4.80 a month for a sofa that started off split, no good, and 
humiliating—you couldn’t take any joy in owning it.  And the 
joylessness stank, pervaded everything.  The stink of it kept you from 
painting the beaverboard walls; from getting a matching piece of 
material for the chair; even from sewing up the split, which became a 
gash, which became a gaping chasm that exposed the cheap frame and 
cheaper upholstery.  It withheld the refreshment in a sleep slept on 
it. . . .39 
The Breedloves accept the torn couch even though it is clear that the 
law affords them a remedy.  However, the Breedloves are unaware of the 
legal remedies they might have and they lack the ability to bring a lawsuit.  
This example illustrates that rights, remedies, and legal protections can 
only be effective if people have the power to use them.  The Breedloves are 
powerless because they have been trained to be powerless; they accept 
whatever injustice comes their way because they have come to learn that 
this is the lot life continually deals them. 
In an interesting contrast, especially to Pecola, stands the character of 
Maureen Peal.  Maureen is a new African-American girl in Pecola’s school, 
and she is nicely dressed, rich (relative to the other girls), popular, and self-
confident.  Maureen has “enchanted the entire school” and has a “rich 
autumn ripeness in her walk.”40  In one scene, Maureen describes an 
instance where her uncle sued an ice cream store that refused to serve him: 
  ”My uncle sued Isaley’s,” Maureen said to the three of us.  “He sued 
the Isaley’s in Akron.  They said he was disorderly and that that was why 
they wouldn’t serve him, but a friend of his, a policeman, came in and 
beared the witness, so the suit went through.” 
  ”What’s a suit?” 
  ”It’s when you can beat them up if you want to and won’t anybody do 
nothing.  Our family does it all the time.  We believe in suits.”41 
In contrast to the Breedloves, Maureen Peal has considerable power 
because she has a very different mindset.  The Peal family members are 
aware of their legal rights and are able to use the legal system effectively.  
They have the financial resources to do so, as well as the assistance of a 
 
 39. TONI MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE 36 (1998). 
 40. Id. at 62. 
 41. Id. at 68. 
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policeman whose testimony was essential to the success of Maureen’s 
uncle’s lawsuit. 
These scenes from The Bluest Eye illustrate a profound problem with 
individual remedies—they are only effective to the extent that individuals 
have power to exercise them.  Individual remedies are often powerless in 
the face of larger forces created by social structure.  A person may have the 
legal opportunity to bargain to modify a contract, lease, or employment 
agreement or to sue for redress if wronged.  But unless that person has the 
knowledge and ability to bargain or to sue, the opportunities are often not 
very empowering. 
If we afford privacy rights, we must do so in a system where they can 
be meaningfully exercised.  Rights to consent to the collection of data also 
lack much meaning if people can be readily pressured, mislead, or coerced 
into relinquishing their information.42  Anita Allen notes that people readily 
surrender their privacy, and privacy expectations are eroding.43  According 
to Allen, “[p]rivacy is not an optional good” because it is a “precondition 
for a liberal egalitarian society.”44  A legal system that enforces privacy 
largely through individual rights and remedies will encounter significant 
problems because of the difficulties for individuals to recognize the harms 
of relinquishing control over the information and to have the power and 
resources to exercise their rights. 
Additionally, the traditional model’s focus on privacy invasions as 
harms to specific individuals often overlooks the fact that certain privacy 
problems are structural and affect not merely particular individuals but 
society as a whole.45  Privacy cannot merely be enforced at the initiative of 
particular individuals.  Privacy, as Paul Schwartz contends, should be 
viewed as a “constitutive value” because “access to personal information 
and limits on it help form the society in which we live and shape our 
individual identities.”46 Since certain privacy problems are structural in 
nature, they affect more than specific aggrieved individuals.  Social 
structure has effects on an entire society.  As Spiros Simitis aptly observes, 
“privacy considerations no longer arise out of particular individual 
problems; rather, they express conflicts affecting everyone.”47 
 
 42. See Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy, supra note 34, at 1660–64; Solove, Privacy, 
supra note 25, at 1453–54. 
 43. Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999). 
 44. Id. at 740. 
 45. Solove, Privacy, supra note 25, at 1454–55. 
 46. Internet, supra note 34, at 834. 
 47. Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 
709 (1987). 
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B. Architecture 
If we look at privacy more as an aspect of social and legal structure, 
then we begin to see that certain types of privacy harms are systemic and 
structural in nature, and we need to protect against them differently. 
The concept of “architecture” is useful for understanding how certain 
privacy problems should be understood and dealt with.  The term 
“architecture” typically refers to the design of spaces—of buildings or 
cities. I use the term “architecture” in a broader way, similar to Lawrence 
Lessig and Joel Reidenberg, who contend that architecture does not merely 
describe the design of physical structures.48  Architecture can be 
constructed through computer code; it is built into the very structure of the 
Internet and other forms of electronic communication, and it shapes the 
extent of liberty and control exercised over people in these media.49 
Architecture emphasizes that legal and social structures are products 
of design.  Information collection, dissemination, and networking are 
shaped by aspects of social and legal structure.  Joel Reidenberg has long 
pointed out that information networks have an architecture, which is 
influenced not only by law but by technological considerations.50  
Architecture is an effective way to describe the way privacy is protected or 
diminished in our society, for the metaphor of architecture captures how 
legal regulations— or the lack thereof—structure social interaction as well 
as the degree of social control and freedom in a society. 
Architecture does not merely structure life by direct physical 
limitations that channel movement (walls, distance, divisions).  
Architecture also alters perception by its aesthetic design, by what it 
expresses.  Frank Lloyd Wright observed that architecture is “the scientific 
art of making structure express ideas.”51  Architecture creates certain 
psychological and social effects.  As Professor Yi-Fu Tuan observes, 
architecture can “sharpen and enlarge consciousness.”52 “Architecture 
continues to exert a direct impact on the senses and feeling.  The body 
responds, as it has always done, to such basic features of design as 
enclosure and exposure, verticality and horizontality, mass, volume, 
interior spaciousness, and light.”53 
 
 48. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 5–6, 236 (1999); Joel 
R. Reidenberg, Rules of the Road for Global Electronic Highways: Merging Trade and Technical 
Paradigms, 6 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 287, 296 (1993) [hereinafter Rules]; see also Joel R. 
Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 
76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1998) [hereinafter Lex Informatica]. 
 49. See LESSIG, supra note 48. 
 50. Rules, supra note 48 at 296–99. 
 51. Quoted in John F. Nivala, The Architecture of a Lawyer’s Operation: Learning from 
Frank Lloyd Wright, 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 99, 111 (1998). 
 52. YI-FU TUAN, SPACE AND PLACE: THE PERSPECTIVE OF EXPERIENCE 107 (1977). 
 53. Id. at 116. 
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According to Neal Katyal, physical architecture affects human 
conduct.54 Architecture can structure spaces to “facilitate unplanned social 
interaction” by positioning door entrances so they face each other.55 Certain 
architectural designs can be suffocating and constraining, such as cramped 
rooms and dark labyrinthine corridors.  Other architectural designs can 
promote open space and social interaction.  According to Thomas Markus, 
“[s]paces can be so linked that communication is free and frequent, making 
possible dense encounters between classes, groups, and individuals.”56 
By influencing human behavior, attitudes, thoughts, and interactions, 
architecture plays a profound role in the structuring of society.  One of the 
ways in which architecture affects society is by enhancing or diminishing 
privacy.  Architecture shapes public and private spaces.  Through the use of 
perspectives and glass, through the positioning of rooms, doorways, and 
offices, physical architecture can determine what is visible or hidden. 
Jeremy Bentham’s design for a prison, which he called the 
Panopticon, demonstrates how architecture can shape the very constitution 
of society by affecting privacy.  Bentham’s design arrays prison cells 
around a central observation tower, from which all cells can be monitored.  
The prisoners, however, cannot see if there is an observer in the tower.  
Therefore, prisoners never know if they are actually being observed, but 
they know that at any moment, someone in the tower might be observing 
them.  This fear of observation results in increased obedience and 
discipline in the prison.  As Michel Foucault observes, “without any 
physical instrument other than architecture and geometry, [the Panopticon] 
acts directly on individuals.”57  Unlike dungeons, which served “to enclose, 
to deprive of light and to hide,” the Panopticon achieves control through 
visibility.58  The Panopticon is a form of architecture that inhibits freedom; 
it is an architecture of social control and discipline.  For Foucault, the 
Panopticon is not merely consigned to physical structures such as prisons.  
It is an architecture that is increasingly built into the entire social system:  
“The panoptic schema, without disappearing as such or losing any of its 
properties, was destined to spread throughout the social body; its vocation 
was to become a generalized function.”59  As Foucault contends, we are 
currently within “the panoptic machine, invested by its effects of power, 
which we bring to ourselves since we are part of its mechanism.”60  In other 
words, Foucault argues that the Panopticon is the architectural design for 
 
 54. Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039 (2002). 
 55. Id. at 1064. 
 56. THOMAS A. MARKUS, BUILDINGS AND POWER: FREEDOM AND CONTROL IN THE ORIGIN 
OF MODERN BUILDING TYPES 25 (1993). 
 57. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON 206 (Alan 
Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1st ed. 1977). 
 58. Id. at  200. 
 59. Id. at 207. 
 60. Id. at 217. 
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modern power relations in society.  Panoptic architecture is increasingly 
replicated in modern society, in both physical and non-physical forms. 
Panoptic architecture, and the architecture Lessig and Reidenberg 
discuss, are “architectures of control,”61 and they function to exercise 
greater dominion over individuals.  Lessig observes that “[c]yberspace does 
not guarantee its own freedom but instead carries an extraordinary potential 
for control.”62  Architecture can function in a variety of other ways.  As I 
will illustrate later, architecture can create a world where people are 
vulnerable to significant harm and are helpless to do anything about it.  
Therefore, in addition to architectures of control, we are seeing the 
development of what I call “architectures of vulnerability.” 
If we view certain privacy problems as architectural, we begin to see 
how the design and structure of information flows affect movement, 
communication, association, and other fundamental practices in a free and 
democratic society.  Privacy is thus an issue about the type of society we 
are building.  Information flows are critical in shaping society in the 
Information Age.  Our environment is not only shaped spatially by the 
architecture of buildings and the layout of cities, but by the design of 
information systems.  This architecture has similar effects as spatial design 
on our behavior, attitudes, norms, social interaction, sense of freedom, and 
security. 
The traditional model often views privacy problems as separate from 
legal structures, as social problems that are remedied by the law.  We often 
see privacy as naturally occurring and threatened by rapidly developing 
technology.  Law must intervene to protect privacy.  However, law creates 
and constructs the world we live in.  This is particularly true with privacy.  
To a significant degree, privacy is legally constructed.  Law already shapes 
our ability to hide information and it influences information accessibility.  
Law makes certain information publicly available; it keeps places (such as 
the home) private by enforcing trespass and property laws.  Law also 
shapes our expectations of privacy in many contexts.63 
The law also influences much of the loss of privacy.  Many privacy 
problems are the product of legal decisions that have been made over the 
past century as we have shaped our modern information economy.  Once 
we understand the full extent of the legal construction of privacy, we will 
realize that privacy is not passively slipping away but is being actively 
eliminated by the way we are constructing the information economy 
through the law. 
 
 61. LESSIG,  supra note 48, at 30. 
 62. Id. at  58. 
 63. See Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosion of Privacy, 39 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 843, 846–68 (2002) (discussing how courts, legislatures, and other government 
entities shape expectations of privacy); Solove, supra note 22, at 1142–43 (discussing how the 
law shaped expectations of privacy in postal letters). 
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For problems that are architectural, the solutions should also be 
architectural.  Privacy must be protected by a particular architecture, one 
that regulates power in our social relationships.  An architecture of privacy 
protection is a way to structure power in social relationships between 
people, institutions, and the government. Unless people’s relationships with 
bureaucracies are placed on more equal footing, affording people default 
property rights in information or other forms of information control will not 
adequately protect privacy.  Protecting privacy thus depends upon 
regulating relationships, often by enforcing limits on the power of 
bureaucratic organizations. 
Architecture protects privacy differently than individual remedies.  It 
is more proactive than reactive; it involves creating structures to prevent 
harms from arising rather than merely providing remedies when harms 
occur.  The traditional model enforces privacy through legal remedies 
employed at the initiative of individuals and penalties to specific 
wrongdoers.  Architectural remedies are more systemic in nature, and they 
work by altering social structure to make it harder for torts and crimes to 
occur.  As Neal Katyal persuasively argues, architecture deals with crime 
differently than criminal penalties; it can prevent crime, facilitate the 
capture of criminals, and can even “shape individuals’ attitudes toward 
lawbreaking.”64  Tort and criminal law often focus on individuals in ways 
that fail to lead to changes in architecture. 
I am not contending that affording individuals a cause of action or a 
remedy for privacy invasions is inappropriate or completely ineffective.  
Indeed, individual remedies must be a component of any architecture.  
However, individual remedies alone are often not sufficient, for their 
viability and effectiveness depends upon the architecture in which they are 
embedded. 
I am also not arguing that the traditional model is incorrect and should 
be abandoned.  The traditional model was designed for the privacy 
problems experienced during the times that Warren and Brandeis wrote 
their article.  Although it still works for a number of privacy problems 
today, it does not work for all privacy problems.  In fact, understanding 
privacy problems with the notion of architecture is not in conflict with the 
view of privacy articulated by Warren and Brandeis.  A critical part of 
Warren and Brandeis’s argument was the importance of the law’s ability to 
respond to new problems.  Today, we face a host of different privacy 
problems.  We need to recognize their differences and adapt the law to 
grapple with them rather than continue to view them through old lenses and 
attempt to resolve them in the same manner as other problems. 
Warren and Brandeis wrote long before the rise of massive record 
systems and information networks.  The problems created by the growing 
accumulation, dissemination, and networking of personal information are 
 
 64. Katyal, supra note 54, at 1073–74. 
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better understood architecturally than under the traditional model.  Viewing 
these problems through architecture reveals that the problems are caused in 
a different manner than we might have originally supposed.  It recognizes 
harm within design and structure.  And it alters the strategies by which we 
seek to adapt law to solve the problems.   
Thus far, what I have said has been relatively abstract.  In the 
remainder of this article, I will provide a specific demonstration of these 
points through the example of one of the most rapidly growing and 
troubling problems of the information economy—the problem of identity 
theft. 
III.  Reconceptualizing Identity Theft 
A. The Identity Theft Problem 
A person loses his wallet while on vacation in Florida.  His wallet 
contains his driver’s license and other personal information.  An identity 
thief uses the victim’s information for more than twelve years to buy and 
sell property, open bank accounts, establish phone service, and so on.65  
Pursuant to a Florida warrant based on the criminal conduct of the identity 
thief, the victim is arrested in California and imprisoned for over a week.  
The victim also has civil judgments issued against him.66 
The identity of a retired 74-year old man is stolen.  Debts continue to 
amass on his credit reports.  Although the victim lives in Maryland, a Texas 
bank issues a car loan to the identity thief in Texas.67  The victim 
continually fights to have the debts removed from his credit reports, but he 
is told to take up the issues with the creditors who claim that the debts are 
legitimate.  Even after debts are removed, they reappear on his credit 
reports because a different collection agency replaces them.68 
These are examples of what has come to be called “identity theft.”  
Identity theft is a problem involving personal information.  As defined by 
the United States General Accounting Office, “identity theft or identity 
fraud generally involves ‘stealing’ another person’s personal identifying 
information . . . and then using that information to fraudulently establish 
credit, run up debt, or take over existing financial accounts.”69  Identity 
theft is not the same as ordinary credit card fraud, where a thief steals and 
 
 65. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,  IDENTITY THEFT: GREATER AWARENESS AND 
USE OF EXISTING DATA ARE NEEDED, H.R. REP. NO. GAO-02-766, at 23 (2002) [hereinafter 
U.S. GAO]. 
 66. Id. 
 67. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Victims of Identity Theft Battle Creditors as Well as Crooks, 
WASH. POST, July 21, 2002, at H4. 
 68. Id. 
 69. U.S. GAO, supra note 65, at 1; see also Jennifer 8. Lee, Fighting Back When Someone 
Steals Your Name, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at C8.  For more background, see generally BETH 
GIVENS, THE PRIVACY RIGHTS HANDBOOK 227–48 (1997). 
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uses a person’s credit card.  In identity theft, the culprit obtains personal 
information and uses it in a variety of fraudulent ways to impersonate the 
victim.  The thief obtains personal information from database companies 
and public records, or by stealing wallets, pilfering mail, or rooting through 
trash to find data on discarded documents.70 
According to the FBI, identity theft is the most rapidly growing type 
of white-collar criminal activity.71  According to estimates by the Federal 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, there are half a million victims 
of identity theft each year.72  In 2001, the most common complaint of 
consumer fraud was identity theft,73 constituting 42% of consumer 
complaints to the FTC in 2001.74  Based on estimates, identity theft results 
in $5 billion in losses to financial institutions and other companies.75 
Identity theft can be a harrowing experience, and it can be devastating 
to victims.  According to estimates, a victim must spend over two years and 
close to 200 hours to repair the damage that identity theft causes.76  Further, 
victims often have to spend thousands of dollars to remedy the harm.77  
Victims experience great anxiety, leading to psychological harm in certain 
cases.78  Victims have difficulty “obtaining loans, mortgages, security 
clearances, promotions and even gaining employment.”79  And as noted 
above, victims are even arrested based on warrants for the crimes of the 
identity thieves.80 
 
 70. See Beth Givens, Identity Theft: How It Happens, Its Impact on Victims, and Legislative 
Solutions, Testimony for U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on Technology, Terrorism, and 
Government Information 3–4 (July 12, 2000), at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/id_theft.htm; 
see also JOHN R. VACCA, IDENTITY THEFT 8–9 (2003). 
 71. See Lee, supra note 69, at 8. 
 72. See O’Harrow, Jr., supra note 1, at A1. 
 73. Reuters, Identity Theft Tops Consumer Fraud Complaints, (Jan. 23, 2002), at 
http://www.techtv.com/news/print/0,231102,3369333,00.html. 
 74. See Yochi J. Dreazen, U.S. Is Cracking Down on Thefts of Identity, Arresting About 130, 
WALL ST. J., May 3, 2002, at B4. 
 75. Id. 
 76. See Janine Benner, Beth Givens & Ed Mierzwinski, Nowhere to Turn: Victims Speak Out 
on Identity Theft, (May 2000), at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheft 
2000.htm [hereinafter Nowhere to Turn]; see also Lee, supra note 69, at 8; Brandon McKelvey, 
Financial Institutions’ Duty of Confidentiality to Keep Customner’s Personal Information Secure 
from the Threat of Identity Theft, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1077, 1086–87 (2001). 
 77. Christopher P. Couch, Commentary, Forcing the Choice Between Commerce and 
Consumers: Application of the FCRA to Identity Theft, 53 ALA. L. REV. 583, 586 (2002). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Martha A. Sabol, The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998: Do 
Individual Victims Finally Get Their Day in Court?, 11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 165, 167 
(1999); see also Maria Ramirez-Palafox, Identity Theft on the Rise: Will the Real John Doe 
Please Step Forward?, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 483, 484 (1998); McKelvey, supra note 76, at 
1087. 
 80. Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEX. 
L. REV. 89, 91 (2001); see also Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and Identity Theft Resource Center, 
Criminal Identity Theft 89, 91 (May 2002), at http://www.privacyrights. 
org/fs/fs11g-CrimIdTheft.htm. 
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Identity theft creates these problems because we are becoming a 
society increasingly dependent upon personal information.  Our personal 
information dossiers are critical to our ability to function in modern life.  
We increasingly rely on various records and documents to assess 
reputation.81  According to Steven Nock, this form of reputation, based on 
“credentials,” enables reputations to become “portable.”82  Portability of 
reputation is important in modern society because people are highly mobile 
and creditors often lack first-hand experience of the financial condition and 
trustworthiness of individuals.83  Today, creditors rely upon credit reporting 
agencies to obtain information about a person’s credit history.  The reports 
reveal a person’s consistency in paying back debts as well as the person’s 
loan defaulting risk.  Credit reports contain a detailed financial history, 
financial account information, outstanding debts, bankruptcy filings, 
judgments, liens, and mortgage foreclosures.  Today, there are three major 
credit reporting agencies—Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union.  Each 
agency has compiled extensive dossiers about almost every adult United 
States citizen.84  Credit reports have become essential to securing a loan, 
obtaining a job, purchasing a home or a car, applying for a license, or even 
renting an apartment.85 
Personal information is also used to establish accounts with 
merchants, ISPs, cable companies, phone companies, and so on.  Personal 
information can be employed to access various accounts and record 
systems with financial institutions, health organizations, schools, 
government agencies, and other entities. 
The identity thief not only pilfers victims’ personal information, but 
also pollutes their dossiers by adding false information, such as unpaid 
debts, traffic violations, parking tickets, and arrests.  The harm of identity 
theft is not solely financial; it can permeate into a person’s everyday life.  
The victim cannot readily recover the personal information the way stolen 
property can be recovered.  The victim must constantly defend against the 
identity thief’s next move.  Even after the victim cleans up her credit 
reports, if the identity thief remains at large, there may be further pollution.  
This is another way in which identity theft differs from credit card fraud or 
the theft of an ATM card or access card.  Once the card is cancelled, the 
crime ends.  With identity theft, the crime can continue, for personal 
information works like an “access card” that cannot be readily deactivated. 
 
 81. ROBERT ELLIS SMITH, BEN FRANKLIN’S WEB SITE: PRIVACY AND CURIOSITY FROM 
PLYMOUTH ROCK TO THE INTERNET 314 (2000). 
 82. STEVEN L. NOCK, THE COSTS OF PRIVACY: SURVEILLANCE AND REPUTATION IN 
AMERICA 3 (1993). 
 83. See id. at 3, 73. 
 84. For example, Experian has information on 205 million Americans.  See, e.g., EXPERIAN, 
EXPERIAN FACT SHEET, (2003), at http://www.experian.com/corporate/ 
factsheet.html. 
 85. See, e.g., VACCA, supra note 70, at 30. 
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Additionally, the problem of identity theft is a social problem, not 
only a harm to particular people.  Identity theft weakens the security of us 
all.  There have been several reports of terrorists engaging in identity theft 
to facilitate their activities.86 In one case, identity thieves used victims’ 
identities to create a fake green card, Canadian passport, and Canadian 
citizenship card.87 Further, beyond losses to particular individuals, identity 
theft results in losses to creditors, financial institutions, and companies, and 
these losses are passed down to consumers in the form of higher interest 
rates, prices, and fees. 
B. Identity Theft and the Traditional Model 
Thus far, identity theft has been viewed under the traditional model—
as a harm to individuals by criminals.  Identity theft unquestionably harms 
individuals and certainly involves criminals.  Therefore, it is no surprise 
that identity theft is viewed under the traditional model and that the 
solutions to identity theft emerge from that model. 
In 1998, Congress passed the Identity Theft and Identity Theft and 
Assumption Deterrence Act.  The Act makes it a federal crime to 
“knowingly transfer or use, without lawful authority, a means of 
identification of another person with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, 
any unlawful activity that constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that 
constitutes a felony under any applicable State or local law.”88  Prior to the 
1998 Act, various aspects of identity theft were criminalized by a variety of 
other statutes at the federal level.  The Act provides a more uniform and 
comprehensive penal regime for identity theft,89 and it expands the means 
of identification constituting identity theft to include SSNs, birth dates, 
biometric identifiers, and other information.90 
Since 1998, the vast majority of states have passed laws to criminalize 
identity theft.91  Prior to 1998, only three states had enacted identity theft 
statutes.92  As of 2002, 44 states criminalize identity theft.93  Thus, it is only 
recently that policymakers have turned their attention to identity theft, and 
the overwhelming approach in dealing with it has been to enact criminal 
penalties.  For example, Florida punishes identity theft as a felony, with the 
severity dependent upon the amount of money the thief takes,94 and the 
 
 86. See Shelley Murphy & Douglas Belkin, Terror Link Seen in Identity Thefts, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Jan. 31, 2002, at A1. 
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 88. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (West 1998). 
 89. U.S. GAO, supra note 65, at 5. 
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 94. Fraudulent use of personal identification information is third degree felony.  FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 817.568(2)(a) (2000).  The offense is a second degree felony if the injury is $75,000 or 
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identity thief may be required to pay restitution to the victim.95  Likewise, 
New Jersey punishes identity theft based on the pecuniary amount of the 
injury.96  The New Jersey statute does not provide for victims’ rights and 
remedies.  Pennsylvania has a similar scheme.97  Arizona, one of the first 
states to enact an identity theft law, penalizes all identity thefts as a low-
grade felony,98 but does not address victims’ rights and remedies.  Unlike 
many other states, California, in addition to criminalizing identity theft 
with a maximum one year imprisonment,99 provides assistance for victims 
to repair the damage.  The victim can obtain the fraudulent applications 
made by the identity thief and a record of the transactions and charges.100  
Despite some variations, these approaches view identity theft as a species 
of crime, akin to other forms of criminal behavior, and the law focuses on 
protecting people from the actions of these criminals. 
There are several problems with viewing identity theft exclusively in 
this manner.  First, law enforcement agencies have thus far not devoted 
adequate resources toward investigating and prosecuting identity theft 
cases.  In a GAO survey of 10 states, officials admitted that they had 
“insufficient” resources to respond to identity theft.101  Resources are 
lacking because other crimes, such as violent crimes and drug offenses, 
consume significant resources.102  Additionally, “[i]dentity theft cases 
require highly trained investigators, require longer-than-usual efforts, and 
often end without an arrest.”103  Prison sentences for identity theft are 
 
personal information is used to harass the individual.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 817.568(3) (2000).  If 
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relatively short.104  Identity theft often occurs across different jurisdictions, 
and law enforcement officials “sometimes tend to view identity theft as 
being ‘someone else’s problem.’”105  As a result, most identity theft crimes 
remain unsolved.106 
Second, the retrospective view of the law, which allows individuals to 
fix the damage caused by identity theft, is complicated by the profound 
lack of power individuals have over controlling their personal information.  
Victims experience great difficulty in obtaining redress for identity theft. 
Victims are often unaware that their identities have been stolen until 
long after the identity theft has begun.  A report based on victim surveys 
estimates that it takes victims over a year to discover that they have been 
victimized.107  According to FTC estimates, 20% of identity theft victims 
learn of the theft after two years.108  One tip-off that a person is a victim of 
identity theft is an unusual item on one’s credit report.  The identity thief 
often takes out loans and uses lines of credit which the thief never pays 
back.  These delinquencies show up on the victim’s credit report, and 
destroy the victim’s credit rating. Unfortunately, the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA),109 which regulates credit reporting agencies, fails to provide 
people with adequate resources to discover that they are being victimized 
or repair the damage done by identity theft.  Although the FCRA permits 
individuals to contest the accuracy of information in their credit histories110 
and enables individuals to sue to collect damages for violations of the 
Act,111 these rights often are ineffectual.  One problem is that people often 
do not know what information is contained in their credit reports.  To 
obtain such information, people must pay a fee of $8.50 to each of the three 
major credit reporting agencies—Experian, Equifax, and Trans Union—to 
obtain a copy of their credit report.  And individuals must do this with 
regularity to ensure that their credit reports remain accurate. 
Credit reporting agencies have a duty to investigate consumer disputes 
with the accuracy of their reports, but this often is ineffective in cases of 
identity theft.112  In one of the most important scholarly articles written 
about identity theft, Lynn LoPucki observes that the “victim is asked to 
prove a negative:  namely, that he or she is not the person who borrowed 
from the creditor.  The victim’s evidence is likely to be complex and 
circumstantial.”113  Creditors do not have sufficient incentives to 
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investigate, for if the victim is correct, creditors cannot recover on the 
debt.114  LoPucki also aptly argues that the “victim lacks a forum in which 
to proceed.  The victim has no right to a hearing on the accuracy of the 
information requested.”115  Moreover, the “FTC seldom acts on the 
complaint of a single customer.”116 
The FCRA does not allow people to sue for “defamation, invasion of 
privacy, or negligence” when the credit reporting agency discloses false 
information or a creditor reports false information to a credit reporting 
agency unless the information is “furnished with malice or willful intent to 
injure such consumer.”117  Rather, the FCRA provides a cause of action for 
negligently failing to comply with its provisions.118  However, a victim 
must bring an action within two years “from the date on which the liability 
arises.”119  In TRW, Inc. v. Andrews,120 the Supreme Court held that two-
year statute of limitations period does not begin to run when the plaintiff 
discovers that the FCRA has been violated.  Rather, the statute of 
limitations begins when the violations occurred, even if the plaintiff 
remains unaware of the violations. 
At present, the law does not allow individuals enough involvement in 
the uses and dissemination of their personal information to quickly 
discover that they are victims of identity theft or to obtain redress after 
identity theft occurs. 
Viewing identity theft under the traditional model—as a series of 
isolated thefts from particular individuals—results in commentators often 
urging individuals to take a variety of steps to avoid being victimized.  
Thus, many discussions about solving identity theft include 
recommendations for how individuals can protect themselves against 
identity theft.  As one commentator concludes:  “[W]ith hard work, 
cooperation, and effective communication between law enforcement and 
the public, identity thieves will be held accountable.”121  Professor Fred 
Cate takes an even stronger position, contending that the problem of 
identity theft can be prevented significantly if people exercised more care 
over their data: 
Despite all the bills introduced to combat the theft of identity, 
individual action may provide the best defense:  keeping a close watch 
on account activity; reporting suspicious or unfamiliar transactions 
promptly; properly destroying commercial solicitations; storing 
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valuable documents securely; protecting account names and passwords; 
and never disclosing personal information to unknown callers.122 
A report by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation reprinted by 
the FTC suggests several tips for people to “minimize” the risk of identity 
theft:123 
Pay attention to your billing cycles. . . . 
Guard your mail from theft . . . . 
Do not give out personal information . . . . 
Keep items with personal information in a safe place. . . . 
Give your SSN only when absolutely necessary. . . . 
Don’t carry your SSN card; leave it in a secure place. . . . 
Order a copy of your credit report from each of the three major credit 
reporting agencies every year. . . .124 
The general advice is that if people take a number of steps, identity 
theft will be minimized.  However, personal data is often collected 
unwittingly, without consent; SSNs are frequently used and refusal to give 
out one’s SSN results in considerable inconvenience; and many people 
cannot even name the three major credit reporting agencies, let alone 
request a copy of their credit reports, for which they are charged a fee.  
Even if people did take all these steps, the risks of identity theft are still not 
significantly minimized.  According to an official at the FTC, “[t]here is no 
way you can fully immunize yourself from identity theft because the 
information is out there.”125 
I contend that the prevailing approach toward dealing with identity 
theft—by relying on increasing criminal penalties and by depending upon 
individuals to take great lengths to try to protect themselves against their 
vulnerabilities to identity theft—has the wrong focus.  Of course, identity 
thieves should be prosecuted; and people should avoid being careless with 
their data.  The law has significant room to improve in the prosecution of 
identity theft.  But these solutions fail to address the foundations of the 
problem.  The underlying cause of identity theft is an architecture that 
makes us vulnerable to such crimes and unable to adequately repair the 
damage. 
C. Identity Theft as Architecture 
Identity theft is a consequence of an architecture, one that creates a 
series of vulnerabilities.  This architecture is not created by identity thieves; 
rather, it is exploited by them.  It is an architecture of vulnerability, one 
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where personal information is not protected with adequate security, where 
identity thieves have easy access to data and the ability to use it in 
detrimental ways.  We are increasingly living with what I call “digital 
dossiers” about our lives, and these dossiers are not controlled by us but by 
various entities, such as private-sector companies and the government.  
These dossiers play a profound role in our lives in modern society.  The 
identity thief taps into these dossiers and uses them, manipulates them, and 
pollutes them.  The identity thief’s ability to so easily access and use our 
personal data stems from an architecture that does not provide adequate 
security to our personal information and that does not afford us with a 
sufficient degree of participation in the collection, dissemination, and use 
of that information.  Consequently, it is difficult for the victim to figure out 
what is going on and how she can remedy the situation. 
The traditional view fails to address this architecture, for it focuses on 
identity theft as a series of discrete instances of crime rather than as a larger 
problem about the way our personal information is handled.  Even the term 
of “identity theft” views it as an instance of crime—a “theft” rather than as 
the product of inadequate security. 
The architecture enabling identity theft emerges from the government 
and the private sector.  With regard to the government part of the structure, 
the Social Security number (SSN) and public record systems create a 
regime where identity is readily stolen and the consequences are severe. 
SSNs are a key piece of information for identity theft.  SSNs can 
unlock a wealth of other information held by the government and the 
private sector.126  The identity thief, as Lynn LoPucki observes, “ordinarily 
needs personal information about the victim, such as the victim’s name, 
social security number, birth date, or mother’s maiden name.”127  Thus, 
information enables the identity thief to apply for credit or open accounts in 
the victim’s name.128 
One of the primary means by which a national identification system is 
developing in the United States is the SSN.  The SSN is currently used for 
identification in a number of contexts.  SSNs were created in 1936 as part 
of the Social Security System and were not designed to be used for a 
general identifier.  Indeed, for many years, the social security card stated 
that it was “NOT FOR IDENTIFICATION.”129  However, over time, 
numerous federal agencies began using the SSN for identification, as well 
as state and local governments, schools, banks, hospitals, and other private 
sector entities.130 
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In the early 1970s, the growing uses of the SSN raised serious 
concerns that the SSN would become a de facto universal identifier.  In 
1973, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued a major 
report on privacy, stating: 
We take the position that a standard universal identifier (SUI) should not 
be established in the United States now or in the foreseeable future.  By 
our definition, the Social Security Number (SSN) cannot fully qualify as 
an SUI; it only approximates one.  However, there is an increasing 
tendency for the Social Security number to be used as if it were an 
SUI.131 
In the Privacy Act of 1974, Congress partially responded to these 
concerns by prohibiting government agencies from denying any right, 
benefit, or privilege merely because an individual refused to disclose his or 
her SSN.  The Privacy Act was passed to “curtail the expanding use of 
social security numbers by federal and local agencies and, by so doing, to 
eliminate the threat to individual privacy and confidentiality of information 
posed by common numerical identifiers.”132  However, the Privacy Act did 
not restrict the use of SSNs by the private sector. 
The use of the SSN continued to escalate after the Privacy Act.133  
SSNs are collected by private-sector database firms from a number of 
public and non-public sources, such as court records or credit reports. It is 
currently legal for private firms to sell or disclose SSNs.  As one 
commentator has observed, “governmental dissemination of personal 
identifying numbers is still widespread, and limits on private actors are also 
virtually nonexistent.”134 
The SSN functions in the United States as a de facto identifier, and 
there is scant protection on its use.  SSNs are often widely available.  
Schools frequently use student SSNs as student identifiers.  This exposes 
student SSNs to a large number of university personnel.  States often place 
SSNs on driver’s licenses.  This exposes SSNs to anybody who checks a 
driver’s license for identification.  Additionally, SSNs are requested on a 
wide variety of applications. 
SSNs are used as passwords to obtain access to a host of personal 
records from banks, investment companies, schools, hospitals, doctors, and 
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so on.135  The SSN is a powerful number, for with it a person can open and 
close accounts, change addresses, obtain loans, access personal 
information, make financial transactions, and more.  Indeed, several courts 
have noted the myriad ways SSNs can be misused to gain access to an 
individual’s personal information or accounts.  In Greidinger v. Davis,136 
the court struck down a voter registration system requiring voters to 
provide SSNs (which were then made publicly available).  This system 
infringed upon the right to vote because it forced people to risk public 
disclosure of their SSNs in order to vote, exposing them to undue risks.137  
In Beacon Journal v. City of Akron,138 a court held that a state freedom of 
information act did not extend to public employees’ SSNs: 
Thanks to the abundance of databases in the private sector that include 
the SSNs of persons listed in their files, an intruder using an SSN can 
quietly discover the intimate details of a victim’s personal life without 
the victim ever knowing of the intrusion.139 
According to the Court, the disclosure of SSNs would create a “high 
potential for fraud and victimization.”140  Likewise, in City of Kirkland v. 
Sheehan,141 a court restricted the disclosure of law enforcement personnel’s 
SSNs because: 
Access to an individual’s SSN enables a new holder to obtain access to 
and to control, manipulate or alter other personal information. In effect, 
access to an SSN allows a person, agency or company to more efficiently 
and effectively search for and seize information and assets of another.142 
In short, the SSN functions as a magic key that can unlock vast stores 
of records as well as financial accounts.  The SSN is the identity thief’s 
best tool. 
Viewed in terms of architecture, the government has created an 
identification number without affording adequate precautions against its 
misuse.  In so doing, the government has exposed every citizen to 
significant vulnerability to identity theft and other crimes such as fraud and 
stalking.  Seen in this light, the problem is very much the product of the 
law. Identity thieves are certainly to blame, but we must also recognize the 
profound role that the government has played in creating the problem. 
Not only are the uses of SSNs inadequately controlled, but SSNs are 
relatively easy for the identity thief to obtain.  SSNs and other personal 
 
 135. For example, an identity thief purchased the SSNs of several top corporate executives 
from Internet database companies. The thief then used the SSNs to obtain more personal 
information about the victims.  Benjamin Weiser, Identity Theft, and These Were Big Identities, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2002, at B3. 
 136. 988 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir. 1993). 
 137. Id. at 1354. 
 138. 640 N.E.2d 164 (Ohio, 1994). 
 139. Id. at 169. 
 140. Id. 
 141. No. 01-2-09513-7 SEA, 2001 WL 1751590 (Wash. Super. May 10, 2001). 
 142. Id. at 2372. 
 7/18/2003  12:18 PM 
April 2003] IDENTITY THEFT 27 
information that assists identity thieves can be obtained via public records 
or from database companies that market personal data culled from public 
records.  Identity thieves can obtain the data to carry out their crime from 
various personal information record systems.143  Public record systems can 
reveal a panoply of personal information, which can be aggregated and 
combined with other data to construct what amounts to a “digital 
biography” about a person.144  There are over 165 companies that gather 
information from public records across the country and peddle that data 
over the Internet.145  Public records can contain SSNs, birth dates, mother’s 
maiden names, addresses of home and work, property descriptions and 
value, phone numbers, photographs, height, weight, eye color, gender, 
email addresses, and salary information.146  Court records can contain even 
more sensitive information about medical conditions, employment, and 
finances.147  SSNs are in fact required by law to be publicly disclosed in 
bankruptcy records.148 
Identity thieves thus can plunder public records, which are 
increasingly being made readily accessible on the Internet, for personal 
information to carry out their crimes.  For example, recently the clerk of 
courts for Hamilton County, Ohio placed the county’s public records on the 
Internet.  From a speeding ticket placed on the website, an identity thief 
accessed a victim’s SSN, address, birth date, signature, and other personal 
information and opened up credit card accounts in the victim’s name.149 
Further, identity thieves can obtain SSNs and other personal information 
simply by paying a small fee to various database companies and obtaining 
a detailed dossier about their victims.150  Some identity thieves employ 
information brokers and private investigators to obtain personal 
information, and the practices of certain information brokers and private 
investigators are often unsavory.  One practice is hiring pretext callers, who 
call financial companies and impersonate a customer in order to obtain 
personal information.151 
The problem, however, runs deeper than the public disclosure of SSNs 
and personal information.  The problem stems not only from the 
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government’s creation of a de facto identifier and lax protection of it, but 
also from the private sector’s inadequate security measures in handling 
personal information.  Private sector entities lack adequate ways of 
controlling access to records and accounts in a person’s name, and 
numerous companies engage in the common practice of using SSNs, 
mother’s maiden names, and addresses for access to account information.152  
Additionally, creditors give out credit and establish new accounts if the 
applicant supplies a name, SSN, and address. 
The credit reporting system also employs inadequate precautions to 
ensure against inaccuracies in credit reports and improper access to the 
system.  As discussed earlier, our financial reputations are currently 
assessed by credit reporting agencies.  These companies report information 
about our financial condition and credit worthiness to creditors and others.  
People are assigned a credit score, which impacts whether they will be 
extended credit, and, if so, what rate of interest will be charged.  Credit 
reporting agencies do not work for the individuals they report on; rather, 
they are paid by creditors.  As a result, they do not establish a relationship 
with those they report on.  Even though the FCRA gives people certain 
rights with regard to the information reported about them by credit 
reporting agencies, there is still a significant lack of accountability because 
credit reporting agencies have no incentive to compete for the business of 
those they report on.  According to Lynn LoPucki, the problem emerges 
because “creditors and credit-reporting agencies often lack both the means 
and the incentives to correctly identify the persons who seek credit from 
them or on whom they report.”153  LoPucki aptly shifts the focus away from 
the thieves and victims to the entities controlling personal data.  He 
correctly contends that identity theft stems from the private sector’s use of 
SSNs for identification.154 
Viewed in terms of architecture, we begin to see that identity theft is 
part of a larger cluster of problems, caused by bureaucratization.  By this, I 
am referring to problems emerging from the existence of information 
networks maintained by large bureaucratic organizations.  Bureaucratic 
organization, Max Weber asserts, consists of a hierarchical chain-of-
command, specialized offices to carry out particular functions, and a 
system of general rules to manage the organization.155  Bureaucracy is not 
limited to public sector organizations; it is a feature of business 
management as well government administration.156 
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Bureaucracy is deeply ensconced in the modern world, which requires 
the efficient flow of information in order to communicate, to deliver goods 
and services, to regulate, to oversee industries, and to administer basic 
government functions.  As Weber observes, bureaucracy is “capable of 
attaining the highest degree of efficiency and is in this sense formally the 
most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings.”157  
According to Weber, bureaucracy is a superior form of organization: 
[P]recision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, 
discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of 
material and personal costs—these are raised to the optimum point in the 
strictly bureaucratic administration.158 
Although bureaucratic organization is an essential feature of modern 
society and has numerous benefits, bureaucracy can also present numerous 
problems.  As Paul Schwartz notes, bureaucracy depends upon “vast 
quantities of information” that “relate[] to identifiable individuals.”159  
Much of this information is important and necessary to the smooth 
functioning of bureaucracies; but collection and use of personal data pose 
new dangers to privacy.  As the Supreme Court noted in Whalen v. Roe:160 
The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social security 
benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed 
Forces, and the enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly 
preservation of great quantities of information, much of which is 
personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if 
disclosed.161 
There are several general tendencies of modern bureaucracies that 
expose people to great vulnerability.  Paul Schwartz contends that because 
bureaucracy does not adequately protect the dignity of the people it deals 
with, it can “weaken an individual’s capacity for critical reflection and 
participation in society.”162  Additionally, decisions within public and 
private bureaucratic organizations are often hidden from public view, 
decreasing accountability.  As Weber notes, “[b]ureaucratic administration 
always tends to exclude the public, to hide its knowledge and action from 
criticism as well as it can.”163  Bureaucratic organizations often have 
hidden pockets of discretion.  At lower levels, discretion can enable abuses. 
Frequently, bureaucracies can fail to train employees adequately and 
employ sub-par security measures over personal data.  Bureaucracies are 
often careless in their uses and handling of personal information.164 
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These bureaucratic processes exist in a world where information about 
people is collected, combined, and traded without their knowledge or 
consent.  People have minimal participation in the process.  They lack 
knowledge about what information is collected, how it is used, to whom it 
is disclosed, and how carefully it is protected.  Privacy policies often 
promise that data will be kept secure, but they fail to specify how or 
provide enough detail for people to assess meaningfully the level of 
security. 
Therefore, the problem runs deeper than identity theft.  It is the fact 
that we have so little participation in our personal data combined with the 
fact that it flows so insecurely and carelessly without sufficient control.  
The harm is not simply measured in the overt instances of identity theft and 
abuse, but in the fact that we are made more vulnerable to a series of errors, 
abuses, and dangers. 
With ever more frequency, we are hearing stories about security 
glitches and other instances of personal data being leaked and abused.  For 
example, in one instance, explicit details of ninety psychotherapy patients’ 
sex lives, as well as their names, addresses, telephone numbers, and credit 
card numbers were mistakenly posted on the Internet.165  In 2002, identity 
thieves improperly used Ford Motor Credit Company’s code to access the 
credit files of 13,000 of Ford’s customers, which were maintained by 
Experian, a major credit reporting agency.166  Choicepoint, a database 
company that gathers information about individuals and sells it to 
government agencies and various private sector companies, inadvertently 
exposed some of its databases on the Internet.167  Citibank employed a 
database marketing company to collect the email addresses of its credit 
card customers and send them emails offering them access to their financial 
information.168  This was done without verifying whether the email 
addresses actually belonged to the particular customers.169 
The problems of information handling are most vividly illustrated by a 
recent incident involving officials at Princeton University who improperly 
accessed personal information maintained in a Yale University database. In 
December 2001, Yale University established a website enabling 
undergraduate applicants to find out whether they had been accepted or 
denied admission.170  The website also enabled students to enter additional 
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information, such as their interests and hobbies.171  To gain access to the 
website, the students were asked their name, birth date, and SSN.172  SSNs 
were chosen as a password because of their “personally identifiable 
nature.”173  A Princeton University admissions official accessed Yale’s 
website and certain applicants’ accounts on April 3, 2002.174  This was 
made possible by the fact that these applicants had also applied to 
Princeton, and the Princeton admissions officials had the applicants’ SSNs.  
After the official informed other admissions staff of the ability to log onto 
Yale’s website, the admissions staff accessed additional student files from 
admissions’ office computers for a total of twelve unauthorized visits to 
Yale’s Web site.175  Princeton officials checked certain student files more 
than once.176  The Princeton official stated that he was motivated by 
curiosity and a desire to test the security of a Web based system because 
Princeton was looking into providing a similar system for admissions.177 
After discovering the unauthorized access by Princeton, Yale reported the 
incident to the FBI.178 
The focus of the law in this security breach was on the actions of the 
Princeton officials.  Yet the problem was created by Yale’s inept security 
measures, ones that resemble in many ways those used by myriad private-
sector entities that hold even more sensitive personal data and access to 
financial accounts. 
Identity thieves exploit these inadequate security practices.  
Exhortations to individuals to guard their data place the onus on the wrong 
parties.  No matter how careful people are, data is bound to leak out in 
some form or another.  We live in an information society, and it is virtually 
impossible to go about daily life without giving out information to a wide 
variety of people and entities.  Documents with sensitive personal 
information will be exposed in the trash.  Not everyone will buy a shredder.  
Nor will all purchase “firewalls” and other computer security software.  
Even with additional precautions, SSNs will invariably be obtained under 
certain circumstances.  Being secure requires individuals to take 
cumbersome steps, and most will never take all the necessary precautions.  
Even if they did, information could still be obtained by identity thieves.  
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Much of a person’s sensitive information is not exclusively in the hands of 
that person—it is in the hands of various companies.  Some are companies 
that a person does business with, such as financial institutions and utility 
companies.  But others are ones that gather data about people without their 
knowledge and consent.  In other words, even if a person tries to keep her 
SSN as confidential as possible, there are many entities that have it, and its 
security depends upon how carefully these entities protect it.  Frequently, 
these entities sell it to whomever is willing to pay a small fee. 
The disclosure of personal information such as SSNs, birth dates, and 
mother’s maiden names would not expose people to identity theft if this 
data were not used by companies as a way to verify identity.  An identity 
thief has an easy time engaging in massive fraud given the lax security of 
most private sector companies.179  For example, in one instance, an identity 
thief routinely found lost wallets or took discarded documents from 
customers at his former job.  Armed with victims’ SSNs, the culprit would 
apply for in-store instant credit at a variety of stores such as Sears, Circuit 
City, and Apple Computer Stores.  Despite the fact that the identity thief 
was 47 years old, he used the identifying information of an 83-year old 
man, and was readily approved by a store clerk running an instant credit 
check.180  As this example demonstrates, the problem emerges from the 
lack of care in granting credit.  Banks and institutions are in a rush to grant 
credit, as illustrated by the fact that banks send out 3 billion pre-approved 
credit card mailings every year.181 
Private-sector entities are not the only institutions without adequate 
controls on information security; government agencies are also deficient.  
For example, there have been instances where identity thieves readily 
obtained driver’s licenses in the names of their victims.182 
Identity thieves, then, are only one of the culprits in identity theft.  
The government and private-sector entities bear a significant amount of 
responsibility, yet this is cloaked in the conception of identity theft as a 
discrete crime that the victim could have prevented had she exercised more 
care over her personal data.  Identity theft does not merely happen; rather, 
it is manufactured by a legally constructed architecture.   
 
 179. One commentator aptly notes that financial institutions are partly to blame in identity 
theft cases because they may not keep customer data confidential, and he suggests that courts 
hold them liable under a theory of breach of duty of confidentiality.  See Brandon McKelvey, 
Financial Institutions’ Duty of Confidentiality to Keep Personal Information Secure from the 
Threat of Identity Theft, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1077, 1122–23 (2001). Although recognizing that 
the problem stems from the private sector institutions, the solution still focuses on forms of 
individual remedies rather than architectural solutions. 
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Scheme, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Aug. 16, 2002, at 1. 
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Further, the architecture contributes to the harm caused to victims of 
identity theft.  Identity theft plunges people into a bureaucratic nightmare.  
The identity theft injury to victims is often caused by the frustration and 
sense of helplessness in attempting to stop and repair the damage caused by 
the identity thief.  Victims experience profound difficulty in dealing with 
credit reporting agencies183 and often find recurring fraudulent entries on 
their credit reports even after contacting the agencies.184  Identity theft laws 
do not adequately regulate the bureaucratic system that injures victims.  
Identity theft exposes the indifference of the bureaucracies controlling 
personal information to the welfare of the individuals to whom the 
information pertains. 
The traditional model does not recognize identity theft as being 
constructed by the law and the under-regulated security practices of 
bureaucracies.  Therefore, the prevailing approach continues to focus on 
the thieves and on how individuals can protect themselves, despite the fact 
that many thieves are not caught and people cannot protect themselves 
from identity theft.  Identity theft can be prevented if we reform the 
architecture.  It is to this issue that I now turn. 
IV.  Forging a New Architecture 
If we see the problem architecturally, we see an architecture of 
vulnerability, one with large holes, gaps, and weak spots.  The harm is 
caused by the very structure itself.  Living in a dilapidated structure—a 
building with flimsy walls, no locks, peepholes, inadequate fire protection, 
and no emergency exits—is harmful, even without a disaster occurring.  
Modern society is built on expectations—that we will be kept secure, that 
our money will not be stolen, that our homes will not be invaded, that we 
will be protected against violence.  It is difficult to imagine how we could 
maintain a free society if we did not have protection against rape, assault, 
murder, and theft.  If these protections are inadequate, there is harm even 
without being victimized.  People live with greater fear, they stop going 
places, they restrict what they do, and they alter how they live. 
Effective safety is thus partly a design question.  According to Neal 
Katyal, physical architecture can be proactive in combating crime, for it 
can prevent crime.  For example, “cleanliness and aesthetic appeal” can 
make people perceive that a place is safe and orderly, and make people less 
likely to disrupt the place.185  In a similar manner, the architecture of 
information flows can be redesigned to prevent identity theft and 
ameliorate its effects.  Identity theft is the product of an architecture that 
creates vulnerability and insecurity.  The most effective way to combat 
identity theft is to reconstruct this faulty architecture. 
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The recognition that identity theft is the product of architecture and is 
best dealt with architecturally is an important first step, for it focuses the 
debate on the most relevant issues and concerns.  But difficult steps remain. 
What should an appropriate architecture that protects against identity theft 
look like?  In the remainder of this article, I will explore architectural 
solutions to identity theft. 
A. The Problem With Identification Systems 
One of the predominant types of architectural solutions that have been 
proposed for resolving the problem of identity theft is the creation of a 
national identification system.  For example, Amitai Etzioni proposes a 
mandatory system of national identification.186  Etzioni advocates the use of 
a universal identification card that is linked to a database of personal 
information.187  He recommends the use of biometric identification, which 
relies upon unique physical and behavioral characteristics, such as hand 
prints, iris and retina patterns, and facial appearance.188  This system of 
identification would replace SSNs with a more reliable identifier, one that 
would make it harder for identity thieves to fraudulently impersonate their 
victims. 
Although a system of national identification, if administered in a 
reliable manner, could curtail the problem of identity theft, it creates more 
problems than it will solve.  Etzioni severely underestimates the dangers of 
creating a national identification system.  As Richard Sobel observes, 
“[i]dentity systems and documents have a long history of uses and abuses 
for social control and discrimination.”189  Identification tools have been 
used by governments for rounding up disfavored people.190  Etzioni 
contends, however, that identification systems do not “transform 
democratic societies into totalitarian ones.  Totalitarian governments do not 
creep up on the trials of measures such as identification cards; they arise in 
response to breakdowns in the social order.”191 
Although an identification system is not necessarily a catalyst for 
totalitarianism, such a system is a powerful device that can be used by the 
government in abusive ways.  For example, the Japanese-American 
Internment during World War II, in which over 100,000 citizens were 
 
 186. See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 103–37 (1999). 
 187. See id. at 113. 
 188. See id. at 115. 
 189. Richard Sobel, The Degradation of Political Identity Under a National Identification 
System, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 37, 48 (2002). 
 190. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1143 
(2000) (“One factor that enabled the Nazis to efficiently round up, transport, and seize assets of 
Jews (and others they viewed as ‘undesirables’) was the extensive repositories of personal data 
available not only from the public sector but also from private sector sources.”). 
 191. ETZIONI, supra note 186, at 127. 
 7/18/2003  12:18 PM 
April 2003] IDENTITY THEFT 35 
imprisoned in camps,192 depended upon the government’s ability to identify 
citizens of Japanese descent.193  Additionally, identification systems often 
expand beyond their initial purposes, as evidenced by the widespread 
expansion of the use of SSNs.194 Beyond abuses, identification systems are 
far from foolproof, and one of the dangers of biometric identification is its 
permanent connection to the individual.  A digital thumbprint, for example, 
can be stolen.  If a password falls into the wrong hands, it can be changed; 
one’s thumbprint cannot.195  In short, a national identification system will 
pose significant dangers that may outweigh the benefits in reducing identity 
theft. 
Lynn LoPucki recommends a different form of national identification 
system.  LoPucki’s profound contribution to the debate over identity theft 
is his recognition that identity theft stems from problems in identification 
which emerge with creditors, credit reporting agencies, and other entities 
using SSNs and personal data as passwords.  LoPucki contends that the 
problem of identity theft can be solved by devising a better system of 
identification.  He disfavors identity cards as a solution because they can be 
readily lost and forged.196  LoPucki’s proposed identification system would 
allow people to “publicly register their identities and publicly provide 
information for contacting and identifying them.”197 The system would 
enable people to register their identities, provide identification information, 
and choose from certain standard sets of instructions to potential creditors 
for identifying them.198  This system would be administered by a 
government agency.199  Participation would be optional.200  The 
government agency would maintain the database of identification 
information, which would consist of various pieces of information people 
submit such as biometric identifying characteristics, photographs, height, 
drivers’ license numbers, personal data, and so on.201  LoPucki would 
restrict the use of SSNs as passwords, and SSNs would be publicly 
displayed on the website.202  Instead of using SSNs for identification, 
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creditors must consult the website which contains each person’s 
instructions for how to make the identification.203  Creditors failing to do so 
would “lose their statutory exemption from liability for false reporting.”204 
LoPucki’s solution is clever and creative.  One laudatory aspect of the 
system is that it allows people to participate in how they are identified.205  
The system provides people with a limited form of engagement over one 
aspect of their privacy—their identification. 
Unfortunately, despite his great contribution toward understanding the 
problem of identity theft, LoPucki’s solution suffers from the same 
problems as the traditional model.  It relies too heavily upon the initiative 
of individuals.  The system places the onus on the individual to set up an 
account, which requires a personal appearance.  Many individuals may not 
be computer-savvy enough to access and monitor the website.  Although it 
does establish a system which can assist those who decide to utilize it, 
LoPucki concedes that “most [people] are not likely to participate.”206  As a 
result, it would function as little more than a band-aid solution.  Identity 
thieves could concentrate their efforts on the vast majority of people who 
do not participate in the system.  Of course, the system could be made to be 
mandatory, but then it would become oppressive. 
Additionally, I believe that LoPucki’s solution will ultimately cause 
more problems than it will solve.  First, it depends upon the government 
maintaining individuals’ personal information.  The government has had 
significant security issues with its websites in the past, and government 
websites have been hacked numerous times.  There is no guarantee that 
LoPucki’s government agency will have better data security practices than 
other government agencies. 
Second, the website consisting of identifying information would be 
publicly accessible to all:  “Read-only access to the website would be 
unrestricted.”207  This would widely expose this information, which could 
be abused in other contexts.  LoPucki’s focus is on creditors and credit 
reporting agencies, but identification can be used by a multitude of other 
entities for a host of other purposes.  Some people do not want their address 
and other contact information to be publicly displayed.  They may be 
attempting to hide from abusive spouses, stalkers, and others.  LoPucki 
counters that people who desire to conceal their location could use only 
email addresses,208 but location can still be traced.  As LoPucki notes, the 
person must establish an email account through a national provider and 
must install software to detect web bugs (hidden code in emails that can 
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obtain personal data from one’s computer).209  The requirement that people 
take these steps is another way in which LoPucki’s system would 
disadvantage those who are not computer-savvy. 
Third, the public disclosure of SSNs will increase the use of the 
number to link up records about people.  Although it is certainly true that 
SSNs are readily obtained, the availability of SSNs in this central database 
will enable entities maintaining data systems to more effectively and 
thoroughly gather SSNs, which function to connect various personal 
information record systems together.  As I have discussed elsewhere at 
length, there are significant problems with the growing aggregation of 
personal information by private sector entities.210 
Furthermore, address information could be readily snatched up by 
database companies.  LoPucki anticipates this problem and states that the 
website data should be “‘seeded’ with information that can be traced back 
to the website as its source.”211  An example of such seeding, LoPucki 
suggests, is that “the account owner might deliberately misspell words, 
alter capitalization, or abbreviate terms.”212  However, it is unclear whether 
many individuals have the sophistication to concoct creative attempts to 
seed their information.  Even if the database were successfully seeded, this 
might not prevent entities from abroad from misusing the information, and 
these entities may be difficult to prosecute. 
B. A New Architecture:  Participation and Responsibility 
I propose an architecture that establishes controls over the data 
security practices of institutions and that affords people greater 
participation in the uses of their information.  The foundations should be 
formed by the Fair Information Practices, which, as Marc Rotenberg aptly 
observes, create an architecture for the handling and use of personal 
information.213  The Fair Information Practices originate with a 1973 report 
by the U.S. Department of Housing, Education, and Welfare.  The report 
recommended the passage of a code of Fair Information Practices: 
x There must be no personal-data record-keeping systems whose very 
existence is secret. 
x There must be a way for an individual to find out what information 
about him is in a record and how it is used. 
x There must be a way for an individual to prevent information about 
him obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for 
other purposes without his consent. 
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x There must be a way for an individual to correct or amend a record of 
identifiable information about him. 
x Any organization creating, maintaining, using, or disseminating 
records of identifiable personal data must assure the reliability of the 
data for their intended use and must take reasonable precautions to 
prevent misuse of the data.214 
Subsequently, in 1980, the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) established guidelines for the protection of 
privacy.215  The OECD guidelines, building upon the HEW report, 
recommended eight principles:  (1) collection limitation—data should be 
collected lawfully with the individual’s consent; (2) data quality—data 
should be relevant to a particular purpose and be accurate; (3) purpose 
specification—the purpose for data collection should be stated at the time 
of the data collection and the use of the data should be limited to this 
purpose; (4) use limitation—data should not be disclosed for different 
purposes without the consent of the individual; (5) security safeguards—
data should be protected by reasonable safeguards; (6) openness 
principle—individuals should be informed about the practices and polices 
of those handling their personal information; (7) individual participation—
people should be able to learn about the data that an entity possesses about 
them and to rectify errors or problems in that data; (8) accountability—the 
entities that control personal information should be held accountable for 
carrying out these principles.216 
Paul Schwartz, Marc Rotenberg, Joel Reidenberg, and others have  
long contended that the Fair Information Practices represent the most 
effective foundation for the protection of privacy in the Information Age.217  
As Schwartz observes: 
A distillation of fair information principles should be made around four 
requirements:  (1) defined obligations that limit the use of personal data; 
(2) transparent processing systems; (3) limited procedural and 
substantive rights; and (4) external oversight.218 
The Fair Information Practices embody a particular understanding of 
privacy and its protection.  Understood broadly, the Fair Information 
Practices establish an architecture that alters the power dynamic between 
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individuals and the various bureaucracies that process their personal 
information.  The Fair Information Practices focus on two general 
concerns:  participation and responsibility.  They aim to structure the 
information economy so that people can participate meaningfully in the 
collection and use of their personal information.  This does not necessarily 
mean that people are afforded dominion over their personal information; 
rather, people are to be kept informed about the information gathered about 
them and the purposes of its use; and people must have some say in the 
way their information is processed.  In other words, the Fair Information 
Practices aim to increase individual involvement in personal information 
systems. 
Additionally, the Fair Information Practices bring information 
processing under better control.  Currently, as I have discussed at great 
length elsewhere, information processing is out of control.219  Companies 
collecting and using personal information are often doing so in careless 
ways with little concern for the welfare of the individuals to whom the 
information pertains.  The Fair Information Practices recognize that 
personal data processors have special responsibilities and that they must be 
regulated in order to ensure that they maintain accurate and secure records 
and use and disseminate information responsibly. 
The Fair Information Practices are a foundation.  They are general 
principles, and they establish the broad goals for information privacy 
protection.  At the most basic level, the Fair Information Practices place the 
burden of addressing the identity theft problem on the entities that cause 
it—the entities using personal information.  The effectiveness of the Fair 
Information Practices depends upon how they are applied to particular 
privacy problems and how they are enforced.  In what follows, I will 
discuss how the two general aims of the Fair Information Practices—
participation and responsibility—can be implemented to help grapple with 
the identity theft problem. 
(1) Participation 
First, the architecture should allow people to have greater participation 
in the collection and use of their personal information.  Currently, people 
lack knowledge about the information collected about them.  Information 
can be readily disseminated and transferred without a person’s knowledge 
or consent.  There are few requirements for how secure information must 
be kept.  There are rarely any limits as to whom information can be 
disclosed.  Information can be used for whatever purpose the entity 
possessing it desires. 
I recommend an architecture that requires entities gathering personal 
information about people to keep individuals informed about their 
information.  The credit reporting system needs to be reformed.  Currently, 
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even with the FCRA, credit reporting agencies are not responsive enough 
to the welfare of the people whose information they collect and 
disseminate.  For example, people should be allowed to regularly access 
their credit reports for free.220  LoPucki criticizes this suggestion, 
contending that increasing a person’s ability to access information held by 
credit reporting agencies will also increase the identity thief’s ability to 
gain access as well.221  To fix this difficulty, a more radical change in the 
credit reporting system may be necessary.  An opt-in regime to credit 
reporting would significantly curtail problems of improper access to credit 
records.  Currently, credit reporting agencies need not establish any 
relationship to the people they report on.  In an opt-in regime, credit 
reporting agencies would have to contact individuals and would be more 
accountable for improper access to credit records.  Individuals could access 
their credit records through passwords or account numbers rather than by 
supplying SSNs or other personal data. 
When there is an unusual change in the behavior of a record subject, 
such as when a person who regularly repays her loans suddenly starts 
defaulting, credit reporting agencies should notify that person.  The 
architecture should empower people with an easy, quick, and convenient 
way to challenge inaccuracies about their personal information as well as 
fraudulent entries in their credit reports.  Disputes can be resolved with a 
special arbitration system that can function quickly and inexpensively 
rather than resorting to expensive court proceedings. 
If these measures are taken, victims will be able to discover more 
quickly the existence of identity theft since they will be better informed 
about the data collected about them and how it is being used. 
(2)  Responsibility 
The architecture should also be premised on the notion that the 
collection and use of personal information is an activity that carries duties 
and responsibilities.  The architecture would establish specific measures of 
control over entities maintaining systems of personal data.  For example, if 
an entity is providing background-check information about a person, that 
entity should be held responsible for any inaccuracies or deficiencies in the 
information.  After all, the information is often used to determine whether a 
person obtains a job, loan, or license.  Currently, however, companies that 
collect, disseminate, and use personal information do not have many 
responsibilities and duties to the people to whom the information pertains. 
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(a) Existing Accounts and Data Holders 
To establish greater responsibility, the architecture would regulate 
private sector security practices.  For one, privacy policies often merely 
state that data will be kept secure and safe, but these statements have little 
meaning without more knowledge of what practices and measures are 
employed.  Because security is technical in nature, it is unlikely that many 
people will be able to understand and evaluate the specific security 
measures taken. 
Minimum security practices must be established for handling people’s 
personal information or accounts.  An SSN, mother’s maiden name, and 
birth date should be prohibited as the method by which access can be 
obtained to accounts. This is one aspect of LoPucki’s solution that would 
be quite helpful.  However, instead of establishing an elaborate voluntary 
public identification system as LoPucki suggests, identity theft can be 
curtailed by companies maintaining customer accounts employing 
alternative means of identification, such as passwords. 
This solution does not come without difficulties.  Passwords can be 
easily forgotten or found out.  One method is the use of multiple questions 
and answers supplied by the customer at the time the account is created.  
Customers supply the question and the answer.  Questions can include 
one’s favorite songs, places a person has visited, and so on.  These 
questions must vary from institution to institution, for standardized sets of 
questions will result in identity thieves attempting to find out people’s 
answers to those questions.  With varying methods of identification, an 
identity thief will no longer be able to use a few pieces of information to 
access everything.  This will eliminate the severity of the impact of identity 
theft.  The thief may be able to access one or two accounts, but not all of 
them.  Another problem is that so much personal information is maintained 
by various database companies that a person’s answers may exist in these 
databases.  For example, a person might use as a password the name of her 
college, spouse, pet, or child.  This type of information should not be used 
since it is readily available in databases. 
Another problem that might arise is that databases will come to 
include the types of information that people generally use for these 
questions.  This difficulty demonstrates the importance of thinking 
architecturally.  The problem of identity theft is part of a larger structure in 
which companies are not effectively regulated in the collection, use, and 
dissemination of personal information.  If database companies are regulated 
to prohibit the collection of certain types of information, then this data can 
be better protected from falling into the hands of an identity thief.  Further, 
the companies maintaining accounts should use multiple series of questions 
rather than just one question, as this decreases the odds that the identity 
thief will have obtained all the necessary pieces of data. 
Of course, this method of identification is far from foolproof.  But the 
level of sophistication and difficulty needed to carry out an identity theft 
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would be increased.  Identity theft will become harder because thieves will 
no longer have easy access to all accounts through the use of a few pieces 
of easy-to-find information such as SSNs.  Additionally, identity theft can 
be more readily halted.  It is currently a difficult and cumbersome process 
to change one’s SSN.222  A person cannot change her height, birth date, or 
mother’s maiden name.  But questions and answers or passwords can be 
easily be changed.  Thus, once discovered, identity theft will be easier to 
stop and will not continue long after the victim becomes aware of it. 
(b) New Accounts 
The suggestions above concern access to already established accounts.  
Much identity theft, however, occurs through the identity thief opening up 
new accounts under the victim’s identity.  Currently, it is far too easy to 
establish a new account through the mail and the Internet.223  Pre-approved 
credit card applications, for example, enable the recipient to easily establish 
an account and change addresses.  To halt this practice, credit card 
companies should be required to meet with people in person when first 
creating the account.  This will make identity thieves more reluctant to 
engage in fraud, as it will increase their chances of being caught.  The 
downside to this solution is its high cost.  As LoPucki also notes, it is also 
inconvenient for consumers.224 
An alternative solution would be to require companies that want to 
open a new account through the mail to verify a person’s address, date of 
birth, and phone number with a credit reporting agency and then send 
written confirmation both to the address that the applicant lists on her 
application as well as to the address that the credit reporting agency has.  
Further, the company should follow-up by calling the applicant’s telephone 
number listed with the credit reporting agency.  In the event of any 
discrepancies in the information held by the credit reporting agency and the 
individual, the individual should be notified.225  Many attempts at identity 
theft can be halted if creditors take greater care at scrutinizing applications. 
LoPucki contends that even with this notification system, the identity 
thief can still intercept the notification.226  While this is certainly possible, 
it requires additional steps to carry out the identity theft, ones that can 
increase the chances of the thief getting caught. 
The solutions discussed above are only recommendations of the types 
of solutions that can be employed once we recognize that we need to focus 
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on architecture.  Viewing identity theft under the traditional model has 
diverted needed attention from these architectural concerns.  If the 
architecture recognizes the responsibilities of companies maintaining 
personal data, it will provide a strong incentive for companies to devise 
creative solutions and better security. 
(3) Foundations 
These architectural solutions do not require a radical change in the 
law.  The foundations are already present, although much remains to be 
built upon them.  One such foundation is the Federal Trade Commission’s 
(FTC) enforcement over privacy policies.  Beginning in 1998, the FTC 
began to bring actions against companies breaching their own privacy 
policies as a violation of the FTC Act’s prohibition against “unfair or 
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”227  In many of its 
actions thus far, the FTC has merely policed privacy policy promises.  The 
FTC’s view to enforcement has been to make practices match up to 
promises.  As a result, the FTC has been rather weak and reactive in its 
enforcement of privacy policies.228  In a number of cases involving 
companies engaging in blatant breaches of their own privacy policies, the 
FTC has settled, requiring companies simply to stop the offending practices 
and avoid making misrepresentations in the future.229 
However, recently the FTC has begun to require greater security as 
part of its settlements.  In FTC v. EliLilly,230 a pharmaceutical company had 
established an email service that sent emails to patients reminding them to 
take the anti-depressant drug Prozac.  Erroneously, the company sent out an 
email message with the email addresses of all subscribers in the “To” line.  
The FTC complaint alleged that Lilly failed to 
provide appropriate training for its employees regarding consumer 
privacy and information security; provide appropriate oversight and 
assistance for the employee who sent out the e-mail, who had no prior 
experience in creating, testing, or implementing the computer program 
used; and implement appropriate checks and controls on the process, 
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such as reviewing the computer program with experienced personnel and 
pretesting the program internally before sending out the e-mail.231 
The FTC appropriately focused on security issues.  Eli Lilly settled 
and agreed to establish a new security program.232 
Thus far, however, the FTC has been reactive, waiting for specific 
harms to emerge before springing to action.  A recent case involving 
Microsoft Corporation will hopefully signal a shift toward a more proactive 
solution.  Microsoft’s .NET Passport is an online identification service that 
maintains personal information of Internet users (such as email addresses, 
gender, photographs, age, and interests) and allows users to use a single 
username and password to access many different websites without having 
to sign-on to each separately.  Passport also provides a related service 
called Wallet that enables users to enter credit card and billing data which 
can then be used by multiple websites.  In response to a complaint by a 
group of privacy organizations led by the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center, the FTC found on August 8, 2002, that Microsoft had violated the 
FTC Act, and Microsoft and the FTC agreed on a settlement.233  Microsoft 
had promised in its privacy policy that it protected Passport information 
with “powerful online security technology,” but the FTC concluded that 
Microsoft did not provide adequate security.  As part of the settlement, 
Microsoft must create a “comprehensive information security program” 
and assess its security yearly.  Further, it must make its documents about 
security available to the FTC for five years. 
An interesting aspect of the Microsoft Passport case is that, unlike the 
Eli Lilly case and the other cases before the FTC, the security problems of 
Microsoft’s Passport had not yet resulted in a major security breach.  
Instead of waiting for specific harms to emerge, the FTC acted more 
proactively in this case, recognizing that the harm existed in the 
architecture. 
Unfortunately, a weakness in the proposed settlement is that the 
security measures do not go far enough.  The consent order lacks 
specificity about security.  Indeed, the Electronic Privacy Information 
Center recently commented on a number of security weaknesses that are 
not addressed by the consent order.234 
Another hopeful development is the Gramm-Leach-Bliley (GLB) Act.  
The GLB Act requires a number of agencies that regulate financial 
institutions to promulgate “administrative, technical, and physical 
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safeguards for personal information.”235  On February 1, 2001, several 
agencies including the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and the Office of Thrift Supervision issued 
standards for safeguarding customer information.236  On May 23, 2002, the 
FTC issued similar security standards.237  Pursuant to the FTC regulations, 
financial institutions “shall develop, implement, and maintain a 
comprehensive information security program” that is appropriate to the 
“size and complexity” of the institution, the “nature and scope” of the 
institution’s activities, and the “sensitivity of any customer information at 
issue.”238  An information security program consists of “the administrative, 
technical, or physical safeguards [institutions] use to access, collect, 
distribute, process, store, use, transmit, dispose of, or otherwise handle 
customer information.”239  The regulations set forth three objectives that a 
security program should achieve: 
(1) Insure the security and confidentiality of customer information; 
(2) Protect against any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or 
integrity of such information; and 
(3) Protect against unauthorized access to or use of such information that 
could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.240 
The GLB Act is on the right track in its focus on information security.  
The GLB Act represents an attempt at an architectural solution to the 
problem of information security.  However, the regulations under the GLB 
Act remain rather vague as to the specific level of security that is required 
or what types of measures should be taken.  The regulations require 
institutions to designate personnel to “coordinate” the information security 
program; and to “[i]dentify reasonably foreseeable internal and external 
risks to the security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer 
information.”241  These regulations establish rather broad obvious 
guidelines; they virtually ignore specifics.242  Of course, a rule that is too 
detailed in the standards it required could end up being ineffective as well.  
As Edward Janger and Paul Schwartz observe, “command-and-control 
rules” which are detailed and inflexible, can “freeze development of 
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technologies and discourage recourse to less costly alternatives.”243  Janger 
and Schwartz are correct that such regulations, if too specific, can quickly 
become obsolete, discourage innovation, and be costly and inefficient.  
However, rules that are too open-ended and vague can end up being 
toothless.  Although security standards must not be overly specific, they 
must contain meaningful minimum requirements. 
Ultimately, the strength of the GLB Act’s security protections will 
depend upon how they are enforced.  If enforced with an understanding of 
architecture, the GLB Act has the potential to go far in reforming security 
practices.  However, even if the GLB Act is enforced in this manner, the 
Act applies only to financial institutions.  A law requiring security 
procedures must encompass all institutions that process personal 
information. 
Despite these new security provisions, companies continue to maintain 
lax security procedures for the access of financial accounts and other 
personal data.  Thus far, the FTC’s efforts have been somewhat anemic.  
With vigorous enforcement, security practices can change.  But it remains 
uncertain whether the FTC and other agencies will undertake such a 
vigorous enforcement effort. 
V. Conclusion 
Understanding certain privacy problems as architectural—such as 
identity theft—demonstrates that protecting privacy involves more than 
protecting against isolated infractions.  It is about establishing a particular 
social structure, one that ensures individual participation in the collection 
and use of personal information and responsibilities for entities that control 
that data.  In a regime with suitable architecture, individual remedies will 
be far more effective.  The problem of identity theft may never be 
completely eradicated, but in a world with the appropriate architecture, its 
prevalence and negative effects will be significantly curtailed. 
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